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I. INTRODUCTION
In most popular historical accounts of the United States, the last
few decades of the nineteenth century are remembered as the period
when super capitalists, often referred to as robber barons, dominated
the country. Men by such names as Carnegie, Mellon, Gould, Rocke-
feller, Fisk, and Vanderbilt took control of the nation's economy in an
unprecedented display of entrepreneurship. Yet the exploits of these in-
dividual capitalists aided the arrival of an organizational society in
America. One of the new forms of private organization was the law
firm.
Even today, lawyers who are members of law firms constitute a
minority of the legal prfession. In 1980, approximately one-third of
the legal profession were members of private law firms.' However, law
firms have been invested with significance that far exceeds their num-
ber and size.' The corporate lawyers of law firms have been at or near
the "pinnacle of professional aspiration and power" since the late nine-
teenth century.
The law firm cannot be unambiguously distinguished from its his-
torical predecessors. Throughout history, most lawyers have practiced
as individuals. There have been partnerships since the first quarter of
the nineteenth century, but, as the renowned legal historian James Wil-
lard Hurst observed, firms of large membership did not appear until
the end of the nineteenth century.4
The emergence of law firms was an evolutionary process. Until the
post-Civil War period, the private organization of legal work rarely
I. Lawyers-Selected Characteristics: 1954 to 1980, in STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 177 (1986); Lawyers-Selected Characteristics: 1948 to 1970, in STATISTICAL
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 416 (1976).
2. J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 22 (1976).
3. Id.
4. J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 306 (1950).
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went beyond the traditional two-man office. Many of these offices infor-
mally adopted a division of labor comparable to the English solicitor-
barrister distinction. 5 However, these partnerships, with their lack of
formal partnership agreements, 6 and their "dimly lit, poorly staffed"
offices, were "suited to unhurried times and to small claims."
7
Although many of the first metropolitan law firms were "indistin-
guishable from the traditional two-man offices,"' 8 by the 1870's there
were metropolitan firms that contrasted sharply with the simplicity of
the two-man law offices.9 Hurst noted that the Strong and Cadwalader
firm of New York City had a staff of ten (six legal and four nonlegal)
in 1878.10 Similarly, when the New York City firm of Shearman &
Sterling was formed in 1873, it had a staff of seven (five legal and two
nonlegal)."
In addition to having larger staffs than the two-man offices, the
first law firms were more likely to have formal partnership agreements.
Profit percentages were set and the legal work of major clients was
shared.' 2 Shearman & Sterling and the Philadelphia firm of Morgan,
Lewis and Bockius both had such agreements at their founding.1
3
The new law firms of the late nineteenth century certainly were
distinguishable from the "organized, departmentalized, and routinized"
law firms of the twentieth century.14 The fundamental importance of
the first law firms is that they were the vanguard of a transformation in
the way a significant percentage of legal work was organized. It is
therefore essential in a work examining the emergence of law firms to
study the period when law firms first took on characteristics that distin-
guished them from the antecedent two-man offices. For this reason, this
work concentrates on a period of years beginning approximately in
5. Writing in 1872, James Bryce, Professor of Roman Law at Oxford, noted the parallel
between the two-man law office and England's solicitor-barrister distinction. See J. Bryce, An
English View of the Legal Profession in America, 5 ALB. L. REv. 357 (1872).
6. J. HURST. supra note 4.
7. J. AUERBACH. supra note 2, at 23.
8. Id.
9. J. HURST. supra note 4.
10. Id.
II. W. EARLE, MR. SHEARMAN AND MR. STERLING AND How THEY GREW 24 (1963).
12. Id. at 30. Earle's account revealed that even though most of the business was
Shearman's, Shearman agreed to share all the profits of Shearman & Sterling equally with
Sterling.
13. J. STOKES, MORGAN, LEWIS AND BOCKius 51 (1973). Stokes added that formal partner-
ship agreements were not absolutely essential until the 1940's, when tax laws made it necessary to
specify the respective partnership interests so that at death there would be something in writing to
satisfy the Internal Revenue Service.
14. J. AUERBACH, supra note 2.
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1870 and extending to the end of the nineteenth century.
In his dissertation, Wayne K. Hobson presented data that displays
the pattern of law firm emergence that occurred in the late nineteenth
(and early twentieth) century. In the.table below, a "large firm" is any
firm with at least four members (any combination of partners and
associates):"5
TOTAL NUMBER OF LARGE FIRMS, BY YEAR,
FOR TOP TEN CITIES
City 1872 1882 1892 1903 1914
New York 10 23 39 64 85
Chicago 2 2 4 23 41
Boston 0 2 2 13 18
Cleveland 0 0 2 8 13
Detroit 0 1 3 6 12
Philadelphia 0 0 1 5 12
Kansas City 0 0 1 8 13
Buffalo 0 0 3 4 7
Milwaukee 1 2 1 4 7
Cincinnati 1 1 2 6 8
Total 14 31 58 141 216
It is apparent that during the late nineteenth century a new pri-
vate legal organization, different from the two-man law office, emerged
throughout the metropolitan areas of the United States. The basic task
of this work is to answer the question: Why did law firms emerge in
late nineteenth century American society?"6 In answering this question,
three distinct analytic approaches are utilized.
In Section II, two case studies of law firms that emerged in the
period under study are presented. The two case studies provide invalua-
15. Hobson, The American Legal Profession and the Organizational Society, 1890-1930, at
161 (1977) (dissertation, Stanford Univ.) (available on Xerox Univ. Microfilms, Ann Arbor,
Mich.).
16. In responding to this question, countless related research questions necessarily arise. Such
issues as the geographic pattern of law firm emergence and the relationship between the emergent
law firms and the nineteenth century's robber barons and monopolizing corporations are discussed
as they apply to the problem of explaining the emergence of law firms.
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ble insight into the personal actions that led to the creation of the first
law firms. Although the main goal of the first chapter is simply to re-
count the origins of two law firms, the case studies reveal the signifi-
cant role that interpersonal relations played in the founding of the first
law firms.'"
Section III moves away from the world of individual actors and
into a broader societal perspective by examining social-structural and
technological factors. It is the aim of Section III to show that certain
societal changes were at least partially responsible for the development
of law firms in the late nineteenth century. Most literature on organiza-
tions and/or the legal profession has tended to stress this approach.
The structural-technological explanation, as it is called in this work,
tends to depict the emergence of laws firms as a natural result of
changes in the demand for legal services. These heavily functionalist
and demand-side analyses were challenged by the work of Magali
Sarfatti Larson in her book, The Rise of Professionalism.8
Larson attempted to prove that the professionalizing impulse is
driven by supply-side concerns. She contended that professionals seek
to monopolize markets, and thus the rise of professionalism is explained
by a collective assertion of special social status and a collective process
of upward social mobility. Larson went as far as calling this collective
assertion "The Collective Mobility Project."' 9 Although Larson rarely
dealt with the legal profession directly, her seminal work does force a
reexamination of the adequacy of the structural-technological explana-
tion of the emergence of law firms.
In Section IV, this work goes beyond the structural-technological
explanation of the emergence of law firms, and uses supply-side analy-
sis to help explain some of the unique features of the law firm. The
supply-side approach is used to present a hypothesis explaining a most
basic, but completely neglected, question - how the newly organizing
lawyers of the late nineteenth century maintained their economic inde-
pendence in the face of the enormous monopolizing impulses of the
business interests.
Taken as a whole, this article is a synthesis of sociological method-
ologies. Case studies, demand-side analysis, and supply-side analysis
17. Admittedly, explanations that rely too heavily on a case study or an interpersonal ap-
proach provide an incomplete understanding of organizations. See C. PERROW. COMPLEX ORGANI-
ZATIONS (1979). Most sociologists have accepted the view that a purely interpersonal approach is
of little use in understanding organizations. People always make history and they always create
institutions.
18. M. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM (1977).
19. Id. at xvi, 66-79.
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are used to provide a comprehensive explanation of the emergence of
law firms in the American legal profession. This work attests to the
importance of all these methodologies and rejects the idea that any one
approach is sufficient. Finally, this synthesis is used to explore new
questions concerning law firms and raise still further questions for
research.
II. THE FOUNDING OF THE FIRST LAW FIRMS: Two CASE STUDIES
The initial organizing impulse that makes a group of lawyers unite
into a law firm can be traced to a variety of direct and indirect causes
that are both specific and general in character. The analysis in this
article concentrates on the organization-stimulating factors that were
generally applicable to United States society during the latter part of
the nineteenth century. However, in this section, instead of making
generalized findings, the object is to stress that the actual founding of
particular law firms was a result of unique interpersonal relations, and
more importantly, that these relations were extremely significant in de-
termining the future of the newly founded organization. °
Shearman & Sterling of New York City and Reed Smith Shaw &
McClay of Pittsburgh were selected for study. (Both firms are still
thriving today.) When examining the details of these firms' beginning
years, it is necessary to rely heavily on their respective law firm histo-
ries. 1 These histories were written by partners of the firms, and thus
must be read with the assumption that the author was attempting to
present the best image of his firm. Yet despite the initial skepticism
this might engender in the researcher, the rich factual detail of these
historical accounts puts to rest any suggestion that the works are of
little use in sociological or historical analyses.
A. Shearman & Sterling
The main root of the law firm of Shearman & Sterling was
20. The two firms examined in this chapter were selected in somewhat random fashion. The
main determinants were that there were sufficient resources available (detailed law firm histories)
and that the firms had not been too closely examined in the existing literature concerning law
firms. The sheer paucity of literature in this area rendered the latter condition nearly irrelevant.
Only the Cravath firm stands out in the literature as a frequent reference. This is almost certainly
due to the voluminous history of the firm and its predecessors by Robert T. Swaine. See R.
SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS (1946-48) (privately published at Ad Press,
Ltd., 1946-48). In addition, because of the predominant role that New York City played in the
development of law firms, one New York City firm was intentionally chosen.
21. W. EARLE. supra note Ii; R. DEMMLER, THE FIRST CENTURY OF AN INSTITUTION: REED
SMITH SHAW & MCCLAY (1977).
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Thomas G. Shearman. Shearman first organized the firm that directly
descended to the present-day Wall Street law firm of Shearman &
Sterling. However, a number of significant actors probably had as great
an influence on the founding of Shearman & Sterling as he did.
Shearman was admitted to the bar in December of 1859. Walter
K. Earle, the historian of the Shearman & Sterling firm, described
Shearman's situation at the time. "Shearman was then twenty-five...
and had no clients and nothing to do."22 This description hardly sug-
gested imminent success, or for that matter, imminent development of
a law firm. However, Shearman quickly established ties with David
Dudley Field, who was "a famous lawyer with more clients and would-
be clients, and more of their business, than he wanted or could possibly
have handled."23
Field's eminence in the legal profession of his day was attested to
by his success at attracting clients, his participation in significant liti-
gation (for example, the 1866 Supreme Court case of Ex parte Milli-
gan24) and the reverence with which his contemporaries and near-con-
temporaries held him.2 His greatest contribution was his leadership in
the codification movement of American common law procedure. In De-
cember 1870, The Springfield Republican listed Field as the acknowl-
edged leader of the New York bar.26 In 1895, a year after his death
and twenty years after his most significant codification work, Field was
referred to in legal journals as one who had done great work and as a
true exemplar of the service ideal for the legal profession. 7 Shearman's
early connection with Field, who in turn was "well connected" in all
meanings of the phrase, proved to be the essential contact that allowed
Shearman to establish the necessary interpersonal relations to found a
successful law firm.
In 1860, Field called on Shearman, who at the time was a strug-
gling lawyer taking his first fling at local politics, and thanked him for
a vehement political speech he had given. The speech supported Field's
candidacy in the delegate contests for the national GOP convention of
that year. According to Earle, Field was so impressed with Shearman
that he hired him to assist in the preparation of a book on which he
was working. Field was pleased with Shearman's work and, a short
22. W. EARLE. supra note II, at I.
23. Id.
24. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
25. W. EARLE. supra note II, at 5, 9.
26. Id. at 21.
27. Styles, Response to "The Commercialization of the Profession," 3 AM. LAW. 142
(1895).
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time later, he employed Shearman again (at a higher rate of pay). This
time Shearman worked on Field's great codification project." When
the work was successfully completed, Field offered Shearman full-time
employment. (Again, Shearman was to work on a book for Field.) The
Field-Shearman connection was formalized on February 4, 1864 when
Field hired Shearman as the managing clerk in his office, with the right
to continue taking outside work to be done in "off hours."29 The signifi-
cance of this event was well summarized by Earle: "And thus it came
to pass that Tom Shearman, at thirty, and after five long and difficult
years of . . writing and vagarious small-bit law practice, felt his feet
on solid ground, with his once-in-a-lifetime opportunity beckoning.""0
A formal connection with the office of an eminent lawyer was a reality,
and this generated a new set of interpersonal relations for the firm that
was soon to emerge as Shearman & Sterling.
When Shearman began his formal employment, David Dudley
Field's office was composed of five men. There were two partners, Field
and his son Dudley, and three law clerks."1 Dudley had previously
served as office manager along with fulfilling his duties as the other,
but acknowledged inferior, partner. Earle stated that Dudley was not a
good manager," and thus Shearman assumed an important role.
After Shearman "straightened out" the office and got it in "run-
ning order," he expanded his activities and began working on the firm's
business.33 In 1867, three years after being employed by Field,
Shearman won two "impossible" cases and attained wide acclaim for
the first time. Field realized that it would be difficult to keep Shearman
without making him a partner. In addition, Field had recently been
retained by James "Jim" Fisk, Jr., to begin a complicated law suit
against a major railroad. Field decided to make an offer of partnership
to Shearman, and Shearman accepted. The name of the firm became
Field & Shearman.34
At about this time (August 1867), John W. Sterling, a recent
graduate of Columbia Law School, entered the Field office as an un-
28. W. EARLE, supra note II, at 2-3.
29. Id. at 4.
30. Id.
31. Clerks in this period could either be trained lawyers comparable to present-day associates
or apprenticed young men (and possibly, though extremely unlikely, young women) comparable to
present-day law students. The former were sometimes paid a small salary, the latter, usually re-
ceived no financial remuneration at all.
32. W. EARLE, supra note 11, at 7.
33. Id. at 9.
34. Id. at 10-11.
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paid clerk.3 5 This set the stage for the formation of Shearman & Ster-
ling. However, before recounting Shearman and Sterling's break with
Field, it is important to elucidate a few more details of the interper-
sonal network of the Field office.
The new client, Jim Fisk, introduced Field & Shearman to the
litigious maze that later was referred to as the "Dreadful Decade."
Before its culmination in the late 1870's, such famous super-capitalists
as Jay Gould, Daniel Drew, Cornelius Vanderbilt, in addition to Fisk,
and such prominent politicians as "Boss" Tweed and Peter B. Sweeney
were entangled in each other's affairs. These entanglements have since
acquired names such as the "Erie Wars," the "Rock Island Litigation,"
the "Gold Panic," "Black Friday," and the "Trials of Boss Tweed."' ,
This network of men provided an immense quantity of work for the
lawyers involved.
Both Fisk and Gould secured Field & Shearman as counsel,87 and
the affairs of these two men became the most important generator of
income and future clients for the lawyers of the Field office. Field and
Gould were responsible for an enormous amount of lucrative work, and
their prominence in the daily affairs of the time gave much publicity to
their attorneys. Although harsh criticism abounded concerning the liti-
gants, the lawyers involved had received an unusual opportunity to dis-
play their skills in a publicized arena.38
During this period, after having left briefly over salary problems,
Sterling became a partner, the elder Field greatly reduced his activi-
ties, and Shearman became the real leader of the firm. Both Fisk and
Gould came to rely on Shearman to the exclusion of Dudley Field. 9 At
the same time, Sterling's role grew increasingly important. On Novem-
ber 17, 1873, Shearman and Sterling broke off from the Field &
Shearman office and established their own firm. This apparently rash
action was actually a logical step in view of the following four develop-
ments: (1) Dudley Field (the younger Field) had grown increasingly
jealous and piqued over Shearman's leadership role, making it difficult
for the two men to continue as partners; (2) Sterling was gaining in
reputation and was ready to assume greater responsibilities; (3)
Shearman had a conversation with Jay Gould in which Gould assured
him that Shearman and Sterling could count on his business; and (4)
35. Id. at II.
36. Id. at 12-17.
37. Id.
38. Field & Shearman successfully defended both Fisk and Gould.
39. W. EARLE, supra note II, at 19.
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Shearman and Sterling had reason to believe that they would retain the
business of other clients of the old firm for whom they had been work-
ing. Earle summarized by stating, "The prospects of the new firm were
good."4°
Thus, interpersonal relations played an essential role in the emer-
gence of Shearman & Sterling. The association with the eminent David
Dudley Field, the particular form of human interaction that caused
Shearman to be drawn to Sterling but repelled from Dudley Field, and
lastly, the powerful clients that the Field office attracted, all contrib-
uted to the emergence of a successful new law firm. Of all these inter-
personal relations, it is the latter that had the most lasting significance
for Shearman & Sterling. As members of the Field & Shearman firm,
Shearman and Sterling made the contacts that assured them long-term
success-
And during that time [the Dreadful Decade] Mr. Shearman and Mr.
Sterling acquired the confidence and were handling the affairs of a
number of men who had come to the firm originally because of some
association with Gould or Fisk, and who remained because of
Shearman and Sterling, and who in later years became the bedrock of
the practice of Shearman & Sterling.4
Despite the long-term importance of the big client in the emer-
gence of the particular firm of Shearman & Sterling, it must be kept in
perspective. The emergence of Shearman & Sterling was initially
traced to a well-connected lawyer who had the necessary contacts. In
the case of Shearman & Sterling this well-connected lawyer was David
Dudley Field. In addition, the emergence was a direct result of
Shearman's ability to get along well in a working situation with one
man (Sterling) and his inability to get along well with another (Dudley
Field). In sum, interpersonal relations played a complicated but signifi-
cant role in the founding of Shearman & Sterling, and the interper-
sonal relations that were of great import at the firm's founding also laid
the groundwork for the future of the firm.
B. Reed Smith Shaw & McClay
The preorganizational history of the Reed Smith Shaw & McClay
firm begins at about the same time Shearman and Sterling established
their New York City firm. In the history of this firm, men by the
names of Philander C. Knox and James H. Reed played the roles par-
40. Id. at 17-21.
41. Id. at 19.
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allel to those of Thomas G. Shearman and John W. Sterling.
Knox began his legal career by studying law in the office of a law-
yer from his hometown (Brownsville, Pennsylvania). However, at the
request of a mutual friend, he was soon taken into the office of H. B.
Swope, the United States Attorney in Pittsburgh.4 This friend was the
first identifiable interpersonal relation of significance in the emergence
of the future firm of Reed Smith Shaw & McClay.
Swope was certainly not as well known or as well respected as
David Dudley Field, but he played a similar role. It is interesting to
note that Knox, at the time of his attachment to Swope, is depicted by
Ralph Demmler (the historian of Reed Smith Shaw & McClay) in
much the same way that Earle depicted the young Shearman at the
time of his alliance with Field: "Knox had no money; his family were
of moderate means; since his home had been in Brownsville, he had few
friends in Pittsburgh."" a Again, from such a description, imminent suc-
cess and imminent development of a law firm seemed unlikely. But as
with the case of Shearman, Knox's association with a "connected" man
enabled him to succeed. Also, like Shearman, Knox was of substantial
help to his more powerful colleague, and benefited accordingly. Thus
when Knox was admitted to the bar in 1875, he became the Assistant
United States Attorney in Pittsburgh.
James Reed's legal career began in the office of his uncle, David
Reed, a rather prominent Pittsburgh attorney. With his uncle serving
as preceptor, James Reed "read the law." '44 When Swope died in 1875,
David Reed succeeded him as United States Attorney. One of Swope's
duties that David Reed assumed was the preceptorship of Knox. In
1877, David Reed died and James H. Reed and Philander C. Knox
founded the law firm of Knox & Reed.
The setting for this founding was a Pittsburgh resurging from the
depression caused by the Panic of 1873. 45 From the beginning the firm
represented coal mines. These clients produced much litigation arising
from property damage and miners' injuries. Also, the firm developed a
large river boat clientele. Demmler accounted for this by noting that
Knox came from Brownsville, a river town.4 By the end of the law
42. R. DEMMLER, supra note 21, at 8.
43. Id. at 6.
44. This was the usual path to the bar in this period. It was much later that the law school
became preeminent. (Knox did attend law school briefly in addition to reading the law.)
45. Unfortunately, no written records exist of the work the partners did in the first two years
of the firm's existence. Thus, initial relations with clients are lost. However, Demmler was able to
summarize client relations of approximately the first decade. R. DEMMLER, supra note 21, at 12.
46. Id. at 15.
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firm's first decade, fee payers included famous super capitalists-con-
spicuous were the names of Andrew Carnegie and Andrew Mellon. "7
The founding of the firm Knox & Reed (much later it assumed
the name Reed Smith Shaw & McClay) had much in common with
the founding of Shearman & Sterling. First, their origins can be traced
to a well-connected office. Second, the foundings demanded that the
partners had a congenial relationship (this was particularly significant
in the founding of Shearman & Sterling). And third, both firms were
associated with super capitalists from the beginning which assured the
emergent law firms of economic success.
In concluding this section, something must be said about the im-
portance and the obvious limitations of case studies. It is apparent that
the founding of law firms is intertwined with a network of actors that
determine the moment of the founding, the personnel of the emergent
firm, and the likelihood of success of the new organization. Beyond this,
the network of actors determine much of the future work of the organi-
zation. A major client can determine the type of work and many of the
future clients of a law firm. This is because of two underlying factors.
First, a client of great significance will single-handedly provide enough
work to assure that a firm is financially secure. (Note the litigious
maze of the Dreadful Decade.) And second, the publicity from serving
such clients and the expansive contacts of these clients result in a grow-
ing network of contacts for the emergent firm.
These case studies reveal that the founding of particular law firms
can be traced to unique interpersonal relations, and that these relations
were extremely important in determining the future of the newly
founded law firm. Eminent lawyer, congenial partner, and powerful cli-
ent all contributed to a new organization. Yet these studies only ex-
amine individual actors and not the society in which these actors
worked. Thus, the question of why law firms emerged in the late nine-
teenth century remains unanswered. It is this question that the struc-
tural-technological analysis of Section III addresses.
III. THE STRUCTURAL-TECHNOLOGICAL EXPLANATION
In his voluminous and ground-breaking work, The Growth of
American Law, James Willard Hurst presented the first contemporary
history of the development of American law and of the American bar."8
Two of Hurst's accomplishments are especially relevant to this article.
47. Id. at 14.
48. J. HURST. supra note 4.
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First, he depicted the late nineteenth century as an enormously signifi-
cant watershed in the history of the American legal profession. And
second, he identified and began to analyze how social, economic, politi-
cal, and legal factors contributed to this watershed. These two achieve-
ments stimulated further research that is- important to a study of law
firms. Together, Hurst and his disciples have presented analyses de-
rived from studying broad social-structural and technological changes
in American society. This type of analysis is referred to in this work as
the structural-technological school. The task here is to sort through the
structural-technological school's significant findings and present those
factors that are of greatest utility in explaining the emergence of law
firms in late nineteenth century America. 9
The structural-technological school's general findings are that in
the late nineteenth century important changes occurred in the law, in
the structure of the legal profession, and in the society in which the
profession was set. This article is concerned solely with a particular
structural change in the profession - the emergence of law firms. Yet
before delving into the structural and technological developments un-
derlying this change, it is important to note that the emergence of law
firms was only one of three extremely significant structural changes in
the legal profession during the years 1870-1900. As Hobson observed,
three major organizational changes in the legal profession transpired in
the period extending from the late nineteenth century until the early
twentieth century. These were the development of large law firms, the
growth in number and importance of law schools, and the growth in
number and size of local, state, and national bar associations."
49. From the outset, it must be observed that although the structural-technological school
produced a relatively large quantity of literature analyzing the late nineteenth century legal pro-
fession, this literature left the concerns of this article relatively untouched. The main thrust of the
structural-technological school's work was to delineate important changes that occurred in the
legal profession as a whole. The cumulative result of the literature was a resounding consensus
that the late nineteenth century was indeed a watershed in the history of the American legal
profession. Although this consensus is of great importance to this work, a detailed account of its
derivation is not of much interest here because this work deals with only a fraction of the legal
profession - those lawyers who grouped together to organize the first law firms. Therefore, only
those factors that are useful in explaining the emergence of law firms are studied. Of course,
many of the same factors that are important in studying the legal profession in general are of
equal importance in studying law firms. Yet, the distinctiveness in analytic approaches cannot be
discounted.
50. Hobson, supra note 15, at 76. Hobson concentrated on the years from 1890 to 1930, and
thus for Hobson the main concern was the establishment of these new structures in the "organiza-
tional society" of early twentieth century America, not explaining their emergence. (However, in




Hobson was one of the few structural-technological analysts to
study the development of the law firm as a new and important legal
organization. In the structural-technological literature, there is an
abundance of information on how and why bar associations and univer-
sity legal education developed. On the other hand, similar material on
law firms is in short supply. In this section, an attempt is made to apply
the broad analytical themes uncovered by the structural-technological
scholars to a particular area of research that these same scholars left
barren. When the research is concluded, one is left with a convincing
awareness that the law firm was a functionally appropriate response to
changes in late nineteenth century American society. However, ques-
tions about the sufficiency of the functionalist perspective arise.
In a structural-technological explanation of the emergence of law
firms, five broad social developments of the late nineteenth century as-
sume great importance: (1) the law changing to meet the developmen-
tal goals of nineteenth century America; (2) the rise of corporations
and the response of government; (3) the expansion of the field of fi-
nance; (4) technological change and an attendant ideology of science;
and (5) the changing conception of organizations. Although these de-
velopments have been discussed in some detail in various research, no
encompassing structural-technological work deals exclusively with the
task of applying these social developments (as well as less elucidating
factors) to an explanation of the emergence of law firms. The main
goal of this section is to glean from numerous works the factors which
helped to explain the emergence of law firms. The five social develop-
ments outlined above are the most crucial structural-technological rea-
sons for explaining why, when, and where law firms emerged, but other
factors that add to the explanation are included where appropriate.
A. The Change in the Law
In his award winning book, The Transformation of American
Law, Morton J. Horwitz argued that from 1780 to 1860 the American
legal system underwent fundamental changes to meet the developmen-
tal goals of nineteenth century America."' For Horwitz, the key ques-
tion was who benefited from this transformation. According to Hor-
witz, entrepreneurial and commercial groups reaped the spoils of the
transformation and thus won a disproportionate share of wealth and
power. The key question here is how this "transformation of American
law" contributed to the emergence of law firms in the United States.
51. M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 11 (1977).
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Horwitz distinguished nineteenth century law from its eighteenth
century counterpart by "the extent to which common law judges came
to play a central role in directing the course of social change." 62 The
new role of judges began evolving in the late eighteenth century and by
the 1860s had culminated in what Horwitz called an "instrumental
conception of law."53 Horwitz summarized this evolution as follows:
Law was no longer conceived of as an eternal set of principles ex-
pressed in custom and derived from natural law. Nor was it regarded
primarily as a body of rules designed to achieve justice only in the
individual case. Instead, judges came to think of the common law as
equally responsible with legislation for governing society and promot-
ing socially desirable conduct. The emphasis on law as an instrument
of policy encouraged innovation and allowed judges to formulate legal
doctrine with the self-conscious goal of bringing about social change.
And from this changed perspective, American law stood on the verge
of what Daniel Boorstin has correctly called one of the great "creative
outbursts of modern legal history." '
Horwitz conceded that in its early stages, the instrumental concept
of law aided entrepreneurs' innovative and socially productive schemes,
but he concluded that by 1860 the law no longer embodied the moral
sense of the community-it had become a facilitator of individual
desires. Horwitz did not believe that the instrumental use of the law
codified a consensus of the objective needs of society.5 5 Although Hor-
witz's indictment is important, what is essential here is that it was pre-
cisely this instrumentalism that provided the requisite setting for the
new legal organization of the law firm.
Horwitz mentioned Boorstin's "creative outburst" description be-
cause Boorstin recognized that the dynamic center of this outburst was,
not accidentally, American commerce and industry. 6 By understanding
the needs of the rapidly transforming American society, innovative
nineteenth century lawyers such as the Massachusetts Chief Justice
Lemuel Shaw made the common law a strong ally of industrial pro-
gress.57 By the end of the nineteenth century, lawyers' "creative out-
bursts" had forged a strong alliance between the elite of the legal pro-
fession and commercial interests, and this relationship played a
52. Id. at 1.
53. Id. at 1-30.
54. Id. at 30. See also D. BOORSTIN. infra note 56.
55. Id. at xvi.
56. D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 35 (1965).
57. Id. at 41.
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tremendously significant role in the emergence of law firms. The instru-
mental conception of law was a necessary precondition of this alliance.
A law wedded to industrial progress demanded far different attrib-
utes of its lawyers. Law became functional, leaving less room for deci-
sions based on legal technicalities. A codification movement grew
(mainly through the efforts of David Dudley Field, who, as noted in
Section II, was a central figure in the founding of the Shearman &
Sterling firm). The lawyers of the period acknowledged the age as "em-
inently practical," 58 and this transformation in the conception of law
was reflected in the nature of legal work.
As derivation from natural law and the primacy of justice in the
individual case declined in importance, so too did the skills of lawyers
in achieving these ends. By the late nineteenth century, the eloquent
advocate was an anachronistic description of a lawyer. John S.H.
Frank in an address to the Grafton and Coos Bar Association in 1888
noted this decline in eloquence at the bar: "The Bar is no longer the
arena of forensic declaration. Crowds are no longer attracted to the
court house to listen to the impassioned utterances and imposing peri-
ods of the orator." 59 Frank stressed the decline in importance of impas-
sioned oratory. He maintained that even Daniel Webster, a man with
few rivals in the power of eloquence, would not have monopolized the
business of the courts of late nineteenth century America."0 The estab-
lishment of an instrumental conception of law and its associated alli-
ance with the commercial sector of America irreversibly altered a large
percentage of the lawyers' work and by the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the Webster ideal type of lawyer had become obsolete.
Horwitz made additional perceptive observations. He supplied con-
vincing evidence in support of his hypothesis that a crucial choice of
the antebellum period was to promote economic growth primarily
through the legal, not the tax, system. Horwitz maintained that this
choice had major consequences for the distribution of wealth and power
in American society.61
After outlining changes in the conception of property, the principle
of compensation, the guarantee of monopoly, the conception of con-
tract, and the development of commercial law, Horwitz stated that not
only had the law established legal doctrines that maintained the new
58. Frank, An Address to the Grafton and Coos Bar Association, I GRAFTON & COOS
B.A.J. 547 (1888).
59. Id. at 537.
60. Id. at 539.
61. M. HORWITZ, supra note 51, at xv.
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distribution of economic and political power, but it actively promoted a
legal redistribution of wealth against the weakest groups in society.
62
Horwitz recounted the major advantages of creating an intellectual sys-
tem which gave common law rule the appearance of being self-con-
tained, apolitical, and inexorable. In the last few pages of his book,
Horwitz stated that in the late nineteenth century there was a move-
ment away from an instrumental conception of law and towards an
apolitical formalist conception. This disguised the redistributive and po-
litical functions of law and at the same time reflected the ideas of the
period-science, objectivity, and professionalism.
During the post-Civil War era, instrumental law achieved an alli-
ance with commercial interests and was well on its way to formalizing
and legitimizing this alliance. The soldiers of this battle were far re-
moved from the Webster ideal. A new type of lawyer was called forth
with a new conception of the law. (However, the majority of the legal
profession was not drastically affected by the establishment of the busi-
ness-lawyer alliance. Outside of the commercial centers, legal practice
evolved at a slow pace. The elite, big-city lawyers were most affected
by the changes outlined above.) The new conception of the law and the
flourishing of a new ideal type of lawyer-one who had superior techni-
cal legal skills and knowledge of the intricacies of America's immature,
but fast growing, business community-were necessary conditions for
the late nineteenth century emergence of law firms in the American
legal profession.
B. Robber Barons, Corporations, and the Response of Government
The rise of corporations and the response of government regulation
greatly contributed to the emergence of the first law firms and securely
established these new organizations in American society. As Lawrence
M. Friedman noted in his ambitious work, A History of American
Law: "The rise of the business corporation, in the 19th century, gener-
ated huge controversy, and manufactured enormous quantities of law.
By 1870 corporations had a commanding position in the economy.
They never lost it."6 The strong relationship among robber barons,
corporations, and the new law firms is an essential aspect of the expla-
nation of the emergence of law firms in the American legal profession.
As previously noted, the late nineteenth century provided the legal
profession with a new conception of the law which arguably contrib-
62. Id. at 254.
63. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 466 (1973).
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uted to a transformed role for the lawyer. The transition of the lawyer
from advocate to counselor was also intertwined with a transition in the
type of lawyers' clients. As law became .supportive of developmental
ends, clients with such goals came into closer contact with the law and
lawyers. Despite the period's attempt to establish formalized and
apolitical legal institutions, critics of the new business-lawyer associa-
tion arose. A late nineteenth century law journal noted that when the
common people observed the strong alliance between businesses and the
legal profession, "they began to distrust the power of the courts as
agencies for the attainment of rights and the redress of wrongs, and
[ceased] to respect lawyers and judges as the ministers of justice."'
Despite such growing complaints about the commercialization of the
profession, emergent law firms forged a powerful link in the new alli-
ance of business and law. This relationship was usually initiated before
a law firm came into existence, and the firm's founding tended to be
clearly and strongly related to events surrounding its corporate clients.
1. The Robber Barons
The beginning years of the first law firms were closely tied to a
new type of client. 5 Hobson referred to these men as entrepreneurs or
investment bankers. Most history books have opted for the term robber
barons. To understand how these infamous but dynamic men contrib-
uted to the emergence of law firms, it is useful to return to one of the
case studies.
When the law firm of Shearman & Sterling was established in
1873, Jay Gould promised Shearman that he would take his legal busi-
ness to the new firm.6" This promise was a significant factor in the
decision of Shearman and Sterling to break off from the Field office.
Gould was more than a rich client that assured the new firm a few
large fees. At the time of the establishment of Shearman & Sterling,
there were sixty-three cases pending involving Jay Gould. One year
later the figure had risen to ninety-seven.67 Gould was an example of
the new type of client. He was an entrepreneur attempting to stretch
the increasingly developmentally oriented law to its limit. Inevitably,
the prodigious ambitions of these men resulted in an abundance of
litigation.
64. The Commercialization of the Profession, 3 AM. LAw. 85 (1895).
65. Hobson, supra note 15, at 142.
66. W. EARLE. supra note II, at 20.
67. Id. at 69.
610 [Vol. 9:593
1986-87] LAW FIRMS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 611
The robber barons of the nineteenth century wielded economic
power of immense magnitude. The capital reserves of these super capi-
talists allowed them to pursue extremely ambitious economic goals, and
their pursuit of these goals inevitably clashed with similarly directed
men or other members of American society. Thus lawyers were called
in to settle litigation as it arose. When the quantity of litigation
reached the volume of Jay Gould's, one lawyer became unable to han-
dle properly all of the client's affairs (along with serving the needs of
other clients). Natural divisions of labor resulted and the first firms,
complete with formal agreements, emerged. As Reed Smith Shaw &
McClay historian Ralph Demmler observed, lawyers came together by
the necessity of having manpower and capability to deal with the legal
problems of their clientele.6 8 Lawyers who previously had merely
shared office space began to share the legal work of their clients, and
the informal law office was formalized into the law firm.
Although robber barons played a large role in the emergence of
many of the first law firms, the corporation provided the fertile ground
for the emergence and growth of the vast majority of law firms.69 As
the corporation achieved economic dominance in America, lawyers
were increasingly called upon to organize and advise the new business
organizations. Robert Swaine noted, "As trade and industry passed
from individual into corporate ownership, lawyers who in earlier days
were seldom called into business transactions until litigation had bro-
ken out, were summoned to organize the new corporations and super-
vise their security issues."'70 Legal work was shifting away from the
Webster advocate ideal.
2. The Growth of Corporate Law
The summoning of lawyers to the aid of corporations resulted in
the rapid expansion of the field of corporate law. Two features distin-
guished this expanding field. First, it involved intricate dealings that
often blurred the distinction between business and law, and second,
much larger sums of money were involved. Corporations realized large
profits on transactions which were essentially designed by lawyers.
Thus, the new "corporation lawyer" became highly sought after and
68. R. DEMMLER, supra note 21, at 3.
69. Swaine, The Impact of Big Business on the Profession: An Answer to Critics of the
Modern Bar, 35 A.B.A. J. 89 (1949). Robber barons often controlled corporations. The distinction
here is between the narrowly controlled corporations of the 1870s and corporations with wide
public ownership of stock. Such public corporations became prevalent in the 1880s.
70. Id. at 91.
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rewarded. For the corporation lawyer, the ability to negotiate in the
conference room and draft a good document became far more impor-
tant than persuasive oratory.71 For the profession as a whole, the corpo-
rate clients with their lucrative fees attracted unprecedented numbers
of lawyers into the corporate field. This, in turn, led to more detailed
legal definitions of corporate problems and resulted in increased litiga-
tion. The increased volume of court decisions led to a need for even
more lawyers.72 The corporation thus set in motion a phenomenon that
linked the growth of law firms to the growth of corporations.
The robber barons were transition figures in the change from an
individualist to a corporate capitalist economy. The huge sums of capi-
tal with which these men were involved resulted in unprecedented
volumes of legal work that helped call into being some of the first law
firms. With the establishment of the corporation as the dominant fea-
ture of the American economy, the field of corporate law rapidly ex-
panded. Corporate law called into being the corporation lawyer, and a
whole new form of legal organization, the law firm, to serve the new
corporate clients. Why law firms were needed to properly serve the im-
mense new corporate clients is further clarified by examining the inter-
relationships of government, corporations, and lawyers.
3. Government Regulation
Government intervention in the private economy increased the vol-
ume and complicated the nature of corporate legal work, thus strength-
ening the need for the law firm's particular capabilities. The discussion
below is merely a cursory examination designed to complement the pre-
ceding functionalist argument.
During the 1870s, the robber barons fought tawdry battles over
the stock market, the economy, and the corpses of railroad corpora-
tions .7 The Erie Wars fought by the clients of Shearman & Sterling
(Gould and Fisk) were a vivid example of the financial mismanagement
and public corruption of the robber barons. The big corporations, which
were still dominated by men like Gould and Fisk, seemed able to buy
and sell lawmakers and thus control the law. 4 As Friedman stated:
The halls of legislation were transformed into a mart in which the
price of votes was niggled over, and laws, made to order, were bought
71. Id.
72. M. ZALD, OCCUPATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 27 (1971).
73. L. FRIEDMAN. supra note 63, at 447.
74. Id. at 447-48.
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and sold. The courts were corrupted, too. Justice was a whore of the
rich. In New York, judges like George Barnard and Albert Cardozo
did what the robber barons wished: issued injunctions for a price, sold
the public interest down the river out of ignorance or greed.75
As previously noted, the alliance with the commercial world did not
pass uncriticized in the legal profession. Contemporary critics cried out
at the new alliance perceiving it as a "deplorable tendency. 7 67 How-
ever, reaction outside the profession was swifter and more
consequential.
The decade of the 1870s, in addition to being noted for the ex-
ploits of the robber barons, was also the period when the Granger
movement in the United States peaked. This Midwestern-based move-
ment attempted to bring under control the farmers' enemies-railroads,
warehouses, and grain elevators. Throughout the post-Civil War period,
the American public became more aware of the tremendous power and
the increasingly suspect business practices of the robber barons of the
railroad industry. This led the Granger's to establish commissions in an
attempt to curb the railroads' excesses. Local and state commissions
were relatively ineffective and a push for a federal railroad commission
grew. The result of the Granger movement was the founding of the
Interstate Commerce Commission (I.C.C.) in 1887.77
The founding of the I.C.C. symbolized the growing response of
government intervention in late nineteenth century American society.
Corporations and the lawyers who served them were faced with an in-
creasing amount of regulations. The work of the lawyers grew more
complex and the legal needs of the corporations became more
voluminous.
The growth of corporate trusts in the 1880s and the cries from the
countryside to do something about them led to the second crucial, and
permanent, entry into business regulation. 78 In 1890, the Sherman An-
titrust Act became law. This legislation provided a clear statement that
restraints of trade were against public policy and not enforceable in
court. A multitude of court cases resulted. The industrial giants were
willing and able to enter into battle with the government. 79 As the law
was interpreted by the legal process, it provided huge additions to the
fields of administrative and corporate law.
75. Id. at 448.
76. The Commercialization of the Profession, supra note 64, at 84.
77. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 63, at 394.
78. Id. at 405.
79. Id. at 408.
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The one group that clearly benefited from the growing government
regulation of the late nineteenth century was the lawyers. The lawyers
who benefited the most were those who were best able to deal with the
expanding legal needs of American business. Typically, these were the
lawyers who had been involved with the complicated affairs of the cor-
porations' founding entrepreneurs. The rise of corporations, and the re-
sponse of government regulation, increased the volume, and more im-
portantly, the substance, of legal work. This contributed to the
emergence of new law firms and the expansion of existing firms.
4. The Geographic Distribution of Law Firms
The increased legal-work that was generated in the late nineteenth
century called into being the necessary organization to deal with it.
Therefore, the geographic location of the emerging firms was strongly
correlated with the extent of corporation development in the various
regions of the country. Hobson's compilation of the distribution of large
firms by city clarifies this phenomenon.80
At the turn of the century, sixty-four law firms in New York City
had legal staffs larger than four, while in Chicago there were twenty-
three such firms.8 All other cities lagged significantly behind New
York City and Chicago in law firm emergence. These data are not sur-
prising because at the time New York City was the nation's undisputed
corporate center, with Chicago a distant second.8" The corporation-law
firm relationship, as well as the resulting geographic distribution of law
firms, is further elucidated by examining the field of finance.
C. The Development of Finance
James Willard Hurst got right to the heart of the issue of finance
by observing that in the late nineteenth century, ambitious lawyers
found that the centers of power were closer to finance. 83 When discuss-
ing the legal profession's relationship with the railroad industry Hurst
stated: "The distribution of the most influential new law business re-
80. See supra tabulation p. 596 .
81. Hobson, supra note 15, at 168.
82. There were anomalies in the correlation between commercial development and law firm
emergence. For example, Philadelphia's population in 1903 was more than double Boston's, yet it
had fewer than half as many "large" law firms. How the Cities Grew, in THE WORLD ALMANAC
& BOOK OF FACTS 1980 196 (1979). Hobson suggested that the predilection for an aristocratic
demeanor among the elite of the local bar helped explain Philadelphia's relatively slow rate of
large law firm emergence. See Hobson, supra note 15, at 178-82.
83. J. HURST. supra note 4, at 298.
[Vol. 9:593
1986-87] LAW FIRMS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 615
sponded to a shift in the center of gravity in the economy. Railroad
mergers and railroad finance were the avenue to a whole new field of
corporate counseling." '8 Industry and finance gave direction to the
growth of new types of law business after 1870, and this development
paralleled the growing specialization of law practice.85 But as one com-
mentator contended, it was the genius of lawyers that elevated corpora-
tions to their dominant position.86 This same commentator stated that
corporate strength and growth were dependent on brilliant legal "fic-
tions."' 87 These legal "fictions" were in actuality the imaginative finan-
cial constructs of lawyers. As the field of finance became subtler and
more complex, lawyers began to specialize in this lucrative area to
serve their corporate clients. This increased the propensity of existing
firms to hire more lawyers and of individual practitioners to band to-
gether so they could adequately serve the complex affairs of corpora-
tions. By the 1890s, many of the most ambitious lawyers were actively
pursuing the field of finance.
Within just a few decades, the business lawyer was elevated to the
highest status.88 This was in striking contrast to the situation even as
late as 1868, when John Sterling, balancing his prospects with a Mr.
Hill or the Field & Shearman firm, mused:
At Hill's I should grow as fast as my nature was capable of develop-
ing, from the trying of small cases to the conduct of larger ones, while
at Field's from the immensity of issues involved I should be always in
the background. At Mr. Field's, I must in reality be for years an office
lawyer and where was there ever to be an opportunity of becoming
anything else.8"
With the growth of corporate law and the field of finance, the glamour
of a career as an independent advocate paled.
Hurst noted that the centers of the developing field of finance were
"in a handful of great cities east of the Mississippi."90 This is not sur-
prising because the clients who demanded such financial service as
84. Id.
85. Id. at 297.
86. Foster, Lawyers, Professionalization and Politics: Ideology and Organization in the
American Bar, 1870-1920, at 248 (1976) (dissertation, Univ. of Wash.) (available on Univ. Mi-
crofilms Int'l, Ann Arbor, Mich.).
87. Id.
88. J. HURST, supra note 4, at 297. Hurst noted that the first symbol of this change was that
for a generation after the Civil War, to be general counsel of the railroad was to hold the most
widely esteemed sign of professional success.
89. W. EARLE, supra note I1, at 28.
90. J. HURST. supra note 4, at 298.
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mergers of businesses, railroad affairs, stockholders' suits, and bond is-
sues were located in these areas. Of course Wall Street, with its prox-
imity to financial institutions and commercial organizations, became
the financial as well as law firm capital of the nation. However, "little
Wall Streets" appeared in smaller cities throughout the nation.9 Cor-
porations and their financial needs and services may have been concen-
trated in New York City, but they were by no means exclusively a
phenomenon of New York City.
In sum, the developing field of finance was strongly associated with
the growth of corporations. This burgeoning field was dominated by
lawyers who utilized their collective brainpower in the service of corpo-
rations. These same lawyers, who were closely allied with the rapidly
growing corporate sector, were stimulated to organize into firms and
enlarge existing firms to improve the services they offered to their pow-
erful, and highly lucrative, clients.
D. Technological Advancement and the Ideology of Science
Technological developments of the late nineteenth century also
played a role in fostering the development of law firms in the American
legal profession. New technologies affected law offices in two ways.
First, there were inventions that directly aided or changed day-to-day
legal work. And second, the rapid development of technology in general
contributed to an ideology of science that had both direct and indirect
influences on the American legal profession.
Law offices of the 1870s were simple and plain. Office machinery
was minimal. Clerks, if there were any, were generally unpaid. Over-
head was low. Yet during the 1870s, the two office machines that have
had the greatest effect on offices around the world first became availa-
ble. The typewriter, invented in 1868,92 was generally marketed by
1878.93 In addition, in 1876 the first Bell telephone patent was
awarded, and by 1877, the first telephones were available to the
public.94
The law office without the typewriter was well depicted by Walter
K. Earle in his description of the Shearman & Sterling office of the
late 1870s:
91. L. FRIEDMAN. supra note 63, at 553.
92. Inventions and Scientific Discoveries, in THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS
1980 599 (1979).
93. W. EARLE. supra note II, at 25.
94. Id. at 26.
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Everything in writing had to be handwritten, and all outgoing com-
munications had to be copied in the copybooks .... One day's output
of outgoing letters meant late hours for the clerk. Also, all legal pa-
pers had to be handwritten. Papers such as deeds and wills presented
no difficulty. But not so with long pleadings, petitions and briefs in
lawsuits, particularly when there were a number of parties each of
whom had to be given copies.95
Without the telephone, if lawyers wanted to talk with someone outside
the office, they had three choices-arrange a meeting, send a telegram,
or send a messenger. Clerks and messengers were common members of
law offices because their relatively unskilled labor was necessary.
New office technologies increased the overhead costs of law offices.
However, the increasing need for books, which were the lawyers' tools,
caused even greater cost increases.96 Hurst dated the revolution in the
cost of legal service as sometime after the 1870s. He noted that before
this date, lawyers did not need many books because the intricate web of
administrative regulation had not been woven. Hurst reported, "After
the '70s the printed sources of the law became a flood." '97 An expensive
law library became an essential component of the complete law office.
Growing overhead costs resulting from new technology and more
extensive law libraries provided strong incentives for lawyers to draw
together into firms that could take advantage of economies of scale. If
the sheer growth of the law did not propel a lawyer toward the special-
ist fostering firms, then perhaps the ever-growing overhead costs that
faced the individual practitioner who attempted to serve all of his cli-
ents' needs would.
Technological change of the late nineteenth century must also be
seen in a broader perspective. This was the age of Darwin. The people
of America were acquiring a great faith in science. Even learned men
of the period viewed the natural sciences with undiscriminating enthu-
siasm as the model for the study of all phenomena.98 This ideology was
clearly manifested by members of the legal profession. 99
When Christopher Columbus Langdell became Dean of Harvard
Law School in 1870, he applied his personal belief in science to the
legal profession. Langdell contended that law was a science, and that
95. Id.
96. J. HURST, supra note 4, at 308.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 261.
99. See Adams, Law Under Inequality: Monopoly, in CENTRALIZATION AND THE LAW 64
(M. Bigelow ed. 1906). Adams observed, "The law is an example of Darwin's generalization of
natural selection." Id.
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all available materials of the science were available in books. Thus, he
stressed the case method and translated the idea into the prevailing
method of a whole legal curriculum.100 Langdell raised standards, hired
James Barr Ames, the first career law teacher (Ames had no experi-
ence in practice), and in general greatly expanded the influence of the
law school in the American legal profession. (During the period 1870-
1900, while the number of lawyers increased by 85 percent, the number
of law school trained lawyers increased by 169 percent.) 101
The growth in the acceptance of law school as a way to the bar
necessarily corresponded with a reduction in unpaid law clerks. As
Mayer Zald observed, the growth in legal education was paralleled by
a growth of office technology. 102 Therefore, staff reductions did not sig-
nificantly hurt larger offices that were able to replace unpaid labor with
capital investment. On the other hand, the necessity of capital invest-
ment favored a law firm type of organization that could share expenses
and take advantage of economies of scale.103
For purposes of this study, technological change in late nineteenth
century America was significant on two levels because the emergence
and expansion of law firms was associated with advances in office tech-
nology and with the growing acceptance of an ideology of science.
E. Concepts of Occupational Organization
All of the societal changes discussed in this section had a relatively
direct effect on the emergence of law firms. Yet during the years of the
late nineteenth century, there were many rapid social developments.
These elements of change were a series of tiny events that were gross
only in their cumulative effect. 04 Throughout the period under study,
American society became more urban, more closely linked through ad-
vances in transportation and communication technology, and more in-
dustrial. Profound changes in the demographic, economic, and geo-
100. J. HURST, supra note 4, at 264.
101. Auerbach, Enmity and Amity: Law Teachers and Practitioners, 1900-22, 5 PERSPEC-
TIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 573 (1971).
102. M. ZALD, supra note 72, at 25.
103. The law school's influence on the emergence of law firms should not be overemphasized.
However, the effect of the rise of university legal education on already established firms was sig-
nificant and continued to grow in significance throughout the twentieth century. Yet such a dis-
cussion is not particularly relevant to the explanation of the emergence of law firms. Educational
backgrounds of lawyers have been relatively well studied. See E. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET
LAWYER (1969) for a particularly interesting work. Also, most law firm histories report the educa-
tional backgrounds of the firm members. In these works, unlike Smigel's work, there is little at-
tempt to analyze the relationship between law school attendance and law firm membership.
104. L, FRIEDMAN, supra note 63, at 295.
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graphic structure of the nation resulted."0 5
Broad societal change brings about new ideologies. The late nine-
teenth century has been labeled as the time of the "Go-Getters,"'"
"the Gilded Age," "the factory age," "the age of money," and as "the
age of the robber barons. 1 0 7 Taken collectively, these appellations pro-
vide insight into the changing ideology of the period.
As go-getters, factories, money, and robber barons exerted their
influence, the American cultural hero-the frontier individualist-was
weakened. In 1893, Frederick Turner, in his famous essay entitled The
Significance of the Frontier in American History, announced that the
idea of the open frontier was irrevocably dead. 08 The unchecked belief
in unlimited growth and unlimited resources was no longer a dominant
public opinion. By the end of the nineteenth century:
if one can speak about so slippery a thing as dominant public opinion,
that opinion saw a narrowing sky, a dead frontier, life as a struggle
for position, competition as a zero-sum game, the economy as a pie to
be divided, not a ladder stretching out beyond the horizon.'"
A basic ideological transformation had occurred.
The response to the changed society was seen in the nature of or-
ganizations. In the early part of the century, DeTocqueville had been
surprised at the propensity of Americans to form groups. But organiza-
tions in the last half of the nineteenth century were much more than
clubs and societies:
Noticeably, many strong interest groups developed-labor unions, in-
dustrial combines, farmers' organizations, occupational organiza-
tions-to jockey for position and power in society. . . . People joined
together in groups not simply for mutual help, but to exclude, to de-
fine an enemy, to make common cause against outsiders. Organization
was a law of life, not merely because life was so complicated, but also
because life seemed so much a zero-sum game."'
These organizational impulses were not solely motivated by func-
tionalist necessity. This is evidenced by the fact that the same "interest
groups" that actively pursued "occupational organizations" often pur-
sued favorable licensing legislation."'
105. See Z. MILLER, THE URBANIZATION OF MODERN AMERICA 63 (1973).
106. D. BOORSTIN. THE AMERICANS: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE 3 (1973).
107. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 63, at 296.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 296-97.
Ill. For an excellent discussion of the pursuit of licensing legislation by occupational groups
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During this period, the legal profession also established occupa-
tional organizations to pursue professional goals. Throughout the
1870s, various local bar associations were founded in response to the
perceived need of raising the standards of professional conduct and ad-
mission to the bar. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York
was formulated in the context of the scandals of the Tweed regime,'12
and similarly, the Chicago Bar Association was founded to drive "dis-
reputable shysters who . . . disgrace the profession" out of the profes-
sion."3 This organizational activity culminated in the founding of the
American Bar Association in 1878.
The legal profession's organizational responses paralleled other oc-
cupational groups of the day. Hobson accurately commented that the
emergence of law firms, the growth of university legal education, and
the establishment of bar associations were part of a greater trend to-
wards organization in American society."" Yet Hobson also stated that
lawyers were reluctant to accept the bureaucratic structure of the law
firm. 15 By assuming that lawyers reluctantly formed law firms, Hobson
implied that the emergence and expansion of law firms was a purely
functionalist phenomenon. For Hobson, lawyers were reluctant to
bureaucratize, so they accepted organizational changes in the work-
place only as necessary. Following this line of reasoning, the emergence
of law firms is explained as an appropriate functional response to a
change in the demand for legal services.
With an alternative analytic approach, the organizational impulse
of the late nineteenth century American legal profession can be inter-
preted very differently. The functionalist or structural-technological
school that Hurst and Hobson represent maintains that the emergence
of law firms was a necessary and inevitable result of changed social
conditions. However, the development of market oriented occupational
organizations in the late nineteenth century raises questions concerning
the sufficiency of the structural-technological explanation. Magali
Sarfatti Larson approached the explanation of professional groups' or-
ganizing impulses from a heavily supply-side perspective. Larson
claimed that occupational groups organized to gain market power." 16
see Friedman, Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licensing, 1890-1910: A Legal and Social
Study, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 487-534 (1965).
112. See generally T. HOLTON, PREFACE TO LAW: THE PROFESSIONAL MILIEU 32 (1980).
113. H. KOGAN, THE FIRST CENTURY: THE CHICAGO BAR ASSOCIATION 1874-1974 15
(1974).
114. Hobson, supra note 15.
115. Id. at 152.
116. M. LARSON. supra note 18, at xvi.
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While Larson concentrated on professions as a whole, her supply-side
analytic perspective can be effectively utilized in a study of law firms.
Although the structural-technological explanation provides a con-
vincing explanation of the emergence of law firms, it fails to examine
whether the emergence and proliferation of law firms may be partially
explained by the entrepreneurial drives of lawyers. By concentrating on
the market for legal services, essential research questions can be ap-
proached. Were lawyers organizing into law firms because of self-inter-
ested desires to protect their market? And how, if the robber barons
and the corporations were so vicious in their pursuit of vertical monop-
olies, did the law firms maintain their economic independence?
Certainly, the social-structural and technological developments
discussed in this section are an integral part of any explanation of law
firm emergence in the American legal profession. However, en-
trepreneurial aspirations of lawyers cannot be ignored if a complete un-
derstanding of the emergence of law firms is to be achieved. In the
following section, the supply-side perspective is used to complete the
explanation of the emergence of law firms in American society.
IV. THE MARKET FOR LEGAL SERVICES AND THE ECONOMIC
INDEPENDENCE OF THE EMERGENT LAW FIRMS: THE SUPPLY-SIDE
PERSPECTIVE
Among the hyperbolic quotations found on the back cover of
Magali Sarfatti Larson's book, The Rise of Professionalism,11 there is
one statement that is useful in expressing why the subject matter of
this section is imperative to a comprehensive explanation of the emer-
gence of law firms. According to the British Journal of Law and Soci-
ety,' 8 after the publishing of The Rise of Professionalism, "it will
henceforth be impossible to write seriously about the sociology of law-
yers without attempting to grasp and employ her [Larson's] analytic
framework--or at least respond to it."" 9 Although this statement is
exaggerated, its basic assertion is well founded. In a study of the legal
profession, analyses that do no respond to Larson's market oriented an-
alytic framework are unavoidably myopic. In this section, Larson's in-
novative perspective is applied to the study of law firms.
In the beginning of her book, Larson noted that most sociologists
viewed the professions as independent or neutral vis-a-vis the class
117. M. LARSON. supra note 18.
118. Publisher of M. LARSON. supra note 18.
119. M. LARSON. supra note 18, at back cover (statement by commentator).
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structure, and they viewed the acceleration of professionalization as an
instance of the complex process of modernization. 20 Larson brazenly
challenged this consensus:
My intention is to examine . . . how the occupations that we call pro-
fessions organized themselves to attain market power. I see profession-
alization as the process by which producers of special services sought
to constitute and control a market for their expertise. Because mar-
ketable expertise is a crucial element in the structure of modern ine-
quality, professionalization appears also as a collective assertion of
special social status and as a collective process of upward social mo-
bility. In other words, the constitution of professional markets which
began in the nineteenth century, inaugurated a new form of struc-
tured inequality.""
For Larson, collective goals assumed paramount importance. Social-
structural and technological explanations of professional organizational
emergence, with their emphasis on the demand for professional ser-
vices, played a minor role in her radical analysis. She concentrated on
the supply of marketable services and hence, in her work, the organiza-
tions studied are examined as they affect their outside environments
(usually other organizations), not as functional responses to broad so-
cial-structural and technological developments. For this reason, Lar-
son's analytic framework is referred to in this work as the supply-side
perspective.
Although the structural-technological school's findings provide the
principal foundation of the explanation of the emergence of law firms,
the structural-technological explanation is not sufficient by itself. Orga-
nizational theorist Charles Perrow described the main problem with the
heavily demand-side, overly functionalist, structural-technological ana-
lysts:'22 "[They have] seen the organization as adaptive to and depen-
dent upon the environment. [They have] not considered the other possi-
bility, which, for the important organizations in our society, is at least
equally possible: that the environment has to adapt to the organiza-
tion." 2 ' According to Perrow, the entrepreneurial drives of the supply-
side view should be an important aspect in the study of organizations.
120. Id. at xiv, xvi.
121. Id. at xvi.
122. Perrow actually referred to these analysts as members of the "institutional school." His
definition of the institutional school varies somewhat from the structural-technological definition
used in this article. However, for purposes here, these slight differences are insignificant compared
to the benefits derived from keeping the sociological jargon down to a bearable level.
123. C. PERROW, supra note 17, at 198.
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In Larson's work, the supply-side perspective was applied to the
broad topic of the process of professionalization as well as to the spe-
cific example of the legal profession. Although Larson rarely discussed
the law firm directly, her unusual perspective is invaluable for ap-
proaching particular research questions concerning the emergence of
law firms.
A. The Market For Legal Services
A number of difficulties arise in an analysis of the market for legal
service of the late nineteenth century. First, this work examines only
those lawyers who came together to form the first firms, and these law-
yers represented a small elite portion of the legal profession. Thus, the
lawyers who established the first law firms serviced a market that
shared little in common with the majority of the lawyers of the period.
Second, the services that were marketed by the lawyers of the emergent
firms were themselves in a period of rapid transformation and
growth.'" Whole new fields such as finance were being developed by
lawyers. It was increasingly difficult to distinguish between what was
and what was not a legal service, and more importantly, legal services
that were created by lawyers and legal services that were simply re-
sponses to demands for clients became indistinguishable. However, de-
spite the difficulty in describing the detailed composition of the legal
services market, useful analyses can be made.
The lawyer's market is his clients, and the status and prestige of a
particular lawyer is largely dependent on his clients. 1 5 Thus, the law-
yer's client represents something greater than a mere market unit
which buys legal skills.
An ambitious lawyer is attracted to the market that assures elite
status. As Hobson noted, during the late nineteenth century such dis-
tinctions depended on the types of practice, the social class of clients,
the location of the law office, the size of income resulting from the
practice, and increasingly, the size of the law firm, and the type of
legal training.12 All of the above were clearly affected in a positive
direction (from the ambitious lawyer's standpoint) by the growing alli-
ance of legal practitioners and business interests. Thus, the corporation
provided the perfect marketing target for a lawyer, or more likely a
group of lawyers, who had lofty financial and status aspirations.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 48-116.




1. Collective Action Law Firm Emergence
The law firm provided a functionally efficient organizational re-
sponse to the needs of growing corporate clients. Thus, a clear incentive
existed for lawyers to organize into law firms in order to attract corpo-
rate clients that assured high status. Such a conscious collective action
emergence differed sharply from a functional response emergence.
The emergence of the Philadelphia firm of Dechert Price &
Rhoads, as described by firm historian Robert V. Massey, Jr., appears
to be an example of the collective action emergence model. Massey
noted that Wayne MacVeagh, one of the founders of the firm "came to
Philadelphia in 1875 to arrange a transfer of his practice from Harris-
burg. [His] first move was to look for a likely Philadelphia partner. By
that time he had begun to feel the impact of postwar expansion. '"12
From the above passage, one can glean that MacVeagh saw the estab-
lishment of a law firm as a useful vehicle that would enable him to
assume an important role in the "postwar expansion."
In The Rise of Professionalism, Larson saw the process of profes-
sionalization as a "collective mobility project." '128 For Larson, the "pro-
fessional project" of social mobility was considered a collective project
because only through a joint organizational effort could occupational
roles be created-or redefined-that would bring the desired social po-
sition to their occupants.1 9 She stated that through the upgrading of
an occupation, prestige is attached to professional roles, and by exten-
sion, to their occupants. 3 0 Using her analytic framework, the law firm
can be seen as a vehicle to achieve such occupational upgrading. Be-
cause of its utility in serving the powerful corporate client that assured
a lawyer high prestige, the law firm was an attractive organization to a
lawyer-regardless of his clients' functional requirements at the time.
The above argument views the law firm as an entrepreneurial
manifestation of a few highly motivated individuals. In some instances
this perception is correct, but it must be tempered by the realization
that the legal services market was not a static entity that could be con-
trolled in proportion to one's aggressive economic actions. During the
late nineteenth century, the profession as a whole faced serious chal-
lenges to its market position.
127. R. MASSEY, DECHERT PRICE & RHOADS 14 (1975).
128. M. LARSON, Supra note 18, at 66-79. Although Larson's collective mobility project re-
ferred to the much larger social unit of a profession, her emphasis on collective entrepreneurial
aspirations can be effectively related to the smaller social unit of the law firm.
129. Id. at 67.
130. Id.
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2. Threats to the Market for Legal Services
The market for legal services in the late nineteenth century was
under both direct and indirect threats. By the 1880's, competition from
outside the profession became significant. 131 Newly established title
guaranty companies began to cut into profitable real estate transac-
tions, large interstate concerns started to handle the collection of debts,
and, by the turn of the century, trust companies took on broader re-
sponsibilities for estates and trusts, and certified public accountants
won increasing business. 132 As Hurst pointed out, in each case of en-
croachment by laymen one of two things was likely to be true: "(1) a
particular job, by practice and tradition, had come to be done by law-
yers and laymen . . . or (2) the work in question was new with no pre-
emptions fixed by usage or custom."1331 The encroachment of lay com-
petition forced lawyers to become increasingly aware of the importance
and frailty of their market position.
By the beginning of the 1870's, many lawyers had perceived a
need to take action. For the legal profession, the founding of local,
state, and national bar associations manifested the profession's growing
concern with the market for legal services. Although the stated pur-
poses of these new associations were primarily the maintenance of the
honor and dignity of the profession and the elimination of "disreputa-
ble shysters" from the profession,134 there were far more significant
forces driving lawyers into these organizations. As Lawrence Friedman
noted:
The crisis in the profession was more than a crisis in decency. There
was also, obscurely, a business crisis. The characteristic response of
any trade group to a threat of more competition was to organize and
fight back. At the meeting of the New York bar, "for the purpose of
forming an Association," James Emott complained that the profession
had lost its independence. "We have become simply a multitude of
individuals, engaged in the same business." And the objects and the
methods of those engaged in that business are very much dictated by
those who employ them . . . .In union, it was hoped, there would be
strength against the outside world. 3'
Between the years of 1870 and 1878, eight city and eight state bar
131. J. HURST. supra note 4, at 319.
132. Id. at 319-20.
133. Id. at 320.
134. H. KOGAN. supra note 113.
135. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 63, at 562.
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associations were founded in twelve different states. 13 This organiza-
tional activity culminated with the founding of the American Bar Asso-
ciation in 1878. The bar association movement was a clear example of
individual lawyers organizing to achieve supply-side objectives. Once
the elite lawyers of the bar association movement recognized that they
were "simply a multitude of individuals, engaged in the same busi-
ness," the organizing impulse was a natural outgrowth in the attempt
to collectively achieve goals that would benefit the individual
professional.
The legal profession in the period 1870-1900 was faced with in-
creased lay competition as well as a growing realization that the power
balance between lawyer and client appeared to be shifting towards the
rapidly developing and prospering robber baron-corporate clients. The
founding of bar associations, although symbolically important, had
questionable utility in maintaining a secure market for the legal profes-
sion. Other occupations faced challenges to their markets during this
historical period by resorting to occupational licensing. However, this
was not a viable alternative for the legal profession. As Friedman
noted, such "friendly" licensing was heavily dependent on the absence
of organized economic adversaries.1 37 The legal profession did not fall
into this category, and thus, the legal profession needed more useful
tools than occupational licensing or the newly founded bar associations
to provide lawyers with a secure independent market for their legal
skills.
3. Corporate Practitioners in the Late Nineteenth Century: A
Transformed Elite
For the majority of legal practitioners in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, the sheer growth of the market for legal skills and related matters
ensured a reasonable standard of living. The general practitioner may
have been increasingly performing the same services as his lay competi-
tors, but this was a result of the change in volume and type of legal
work and not a result of an identifiable loss of clients to lay competi-
tion. The individual practitioner continued to serve the same type of
client with similar services throughout the period. The same cannot be
said of the new business lawyers of the expanding cities.
The business lawyer was faced with a completely new type of cli-
ent-the large corporate concern. This new client brought about the
136. Id. at 563.
137. Friedman, supra note I11, at 518-23.
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boardroom counselor ideal type of lawyer."8 It was functionally logical
for this new type of lawyer to organize the first law firms to serve the
growing corporate clientele. These firms emerged in a setting of in-
creasing awareness of lay competition and the growing acknowledge-
ment of the dangers of a commercialized profession. Business lawyers
of the period realized that there was a need for "stringent corrective
influences" to fight deprofessionalizing and commercializing influ-
ences. 8 9 For the elite of the profession, the bar association movement
was one response to this concern. However, for a growing number of
corporate practitioners the law firm provided a secure market and pro-
fessional status and prestige.
Robert T. Swaine, in his voluminous study of the Cravath firm,
noted that during the 1880's, an increasing number of consolidations of
small businesses from individual ownership and management into pub-
licly held corporations occurred." '° The legal and business problems
surrounding this activity were growing in complexity. Swaine stated,
"It was inevitable that for their solution those lawyers should be re-
tained who had already achieved high professional position in other
fields."" 4 Thus, the high status achieved by the business lawyers of the
period often did not translate into a rise in status of individual lawyers,
but merely a transition of duties of the existing legal elite. The ascen-
dancy of the business lawyer resulted in a transformed legal elite, not a
new legal elite. Certainly, some lawyers who had built their reputation
on advocacy may have found it difficult or impossible to become a
respected business lawyer, but the key point is that the legal elite of the
late nineteenth century recognized that the corporate client provided
opportunities to improve and solidify their already enviable position.
The Seward, DaCosta & Guthrie firm manifested this pattern.
This prestigious predecessor of the Cravath firm was one of the oldest
continuously practicing New York firms of the 1880's. During the post-
Civil War period members of the firm rapidly recognized the benefits
to be derived from serving corporate clients. The firm found that corpo-
rate law was: "much more profitable than the old [areas of practice].
.. . Clarence Seward found that the legal engineering of corporate
consolidations, railroad reorganizations and security issues, out of
138. See supra text accompanying notes 59, 60, 63 and 64.
139. Deprofessionalizing the Practice of Law, 3 AM. LAW. 132 (1895). Although the need
for corrective measures was vehemently expressed in this article, no specific recommendations
were made.
140. R. SWAINE. supra note 20, at 369.
141. Id. at 370.
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which bankers and market operators were realizing large profits, af-
forded more lucrative fees than those obtainable in [other areas of]
practice."14 Advantageously situated, elite lawyers of the late nine-
teenth century actively pursued corporate practice with their new or-
ganization of the law firm.
4. The Reality of the Lawyer-Corporation Relationship
With a vision of a legal market consisting of countless demands
for corporate consolidations, it is easy to arrive at the functional expla-
nation of law firm emergence. But this image of the late nineteenth
century business world fails to account for the fact that robber barons
and corporations executed disproportionate power over the economy, as
they ruthlessly pursued vertical monopolies. To quote historian Zane
Miller:
This first generation of American organization men put together a
new kind of business organization of unequaled size, complexity, and
productive capacity. This institution, the vertically integrated corpora-
tion, combined the major economic processes-the acquisition of raw
materials, manufacturing, packaging, marketing, and finance-into
one centralized bureaucracy, whose chief operating principle was effi-
ciency. Though relatively few in number, the vastly powerful new cor-
porations had a dominant influence in the economy.""3
Yet, it was precisely these powerful clients that provided the emergent
law firms with both a secure market and the immense prestige that was
derived from the maintenance of economic independence.
The debate in the late nineteenth century legal profession concern-
ing the growing commercialization of the profession showed that many
lawyers of the day had come to realize the precariousness of the law-
yer-corporation relationship. Some lawyers believed that the "spirit of
commerce" that "contaminated" the profession was deplorable and
often subversive of legal rights.""4 Others noted that the "growth of
great mercantile fortunes . . . lowered the relative importance and dig-
nity of the bar.
'1 45
Despite the growing strength of corporations and the increasing
reality that the legal profession was bureaucratizing to accommodate
them, the elite lawyers were never willing to see themselves as purely
142. Id. at 371.
143. Z. MILLER. supra note 105, at 66.
144. The Commercialization of the Profession, supra note 64, at 84-85.
145. Bryce, supra note 5, at 357.
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spokesmen for corporate interests. Even the most business oriented law-
yers of the day attempted to hold onto the image of the independent
lawyer serving a variety of clients. 1 6 Hobson stressed that such concep-
tions were rooted in the social realities of a more individualistic age,
and that they helped explain the legal profession's ambivalence in es-
tablishing appropriate organizational structures for the increasingly or-
ganizational society of the period.14 Although Hobson's observations
are worthy of note, his analysis neglected the striking fact that the bus-
iness lawyers, despite their alleged ambivalence toward appropriate or-
ganizational structures, maintained a significant degree of economic in-
dependence from their powerful clients.
The examination of the market for legal services provides evidence
that supply-side concerns contributed to the emergence of law firms in
the American legal profession. Lawyers acted to protect and/or secure
their markets, and the law firm played an important collective role. But
the question remains, how did law firms maintain their economic inde-
pendence from the vertical monopolizing impulses of the rapidly grow-
ing corporate clients?
B. The Economic Independence of the Emergent Law Firms
The maintenance of economic independence by law firms of the
late nineteenth century can be explained by four closely related factors
that involved the supply of legal services: (1) the attainment of the
commodity of experience by business lawyers; (2) the development of a
network of personal connections by the emergent firms; (3) the ability
of independent lawyers to invoke the attorney-client privilege (the rule
that forbids disclosure of information to a third party without the cli-
ent's consent); and (4) the slow realization by commercial interests that
legal services were a necessary factor input of production.
1. The Commodity of Experience
The specialized experience that the first business lawyers attained
is best described as a commodity because corporate clients sought out
and bought specialized legal services when they had a particular de-
mand that needed to be fulfilled. This commodity was comprised of
both legal experience and a knowledge of a powerful client's intimate
business affairs. The lawyers of the emergent law firms gained the com-
modity of experience even though they were seldom called into business
146. Hobson, supra note 15, at 91-93.
147. id. at 436.
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transactions until litigation had broken out." '
The entangled affairs of Jay Gould provided a clear example of
how lawyers, in this case Thomas Shearman and John Sterling, gained
the commodity of experience. Gould retained Field & Shearman (Ster-
ling was a clerk in the office at the time) when the "Erie Wars" be-
gan.14 9 Before the lawyers became involved, Cornelius Vanderbilt,
Daniel Drew, James Fisk, Gould, and more were entangled in a legal
and moral maelstrom. It was left to the lawyers to unravel the mess.
The Erie Wars enabled Thomas Shearman and John Sterling to be-
come intimately knowledgeable of the affairs of Jay Gould and pro-
vided the firm of Shearman & Sterling with the invaluable commodity
of experience.
2. The Importance of Personal Connections
Personal connections helped the first business lawyers maintain ec-
onomic control of the commodity of experience. As the complexity of
corporations' legal needs increased, so too did the network of necessa-
rily involved parties. For example, government officials developed im-
portant relationships with corporate legal counsels because of increased
government regulation. For the business lawyer, new roles evolved. As
Larson noted:
The expanding role of government and the growth of legislation af-
fecting the corporation meant, in turn, that one major function of the
legal elite became that of guiding their clients through lobbying or
negotiation. In sum, the elite of the profession provided services that
were not strictly (and often not even remotely) legal services for a
class of particularly powerful and wealthy clients.150
The law firm histories do not stress (or often do not mention) the
importance of personal connections. However, "who you know" was im-
portant for the business lawyers during the late nineteenth century be-
cause the corporations' needs and desires were taking the law and the
legal profession into new areas. As Larson noted, "Elite practice . ..
148. Swaine, supra note 69, at 91.
149. W. EARLE, supra note II, at 14.
150. M. LARSON. supra note 18, at 14. The importance of the awareness of proper channels
and access to these channels must not be underestimated. Glaring examples of useful personal
connections are seen in law firm histories. For example, Reed Smith Shaw & McClay co-founder
Philander Knox had powerful connections in government. The support he enjoyed contributed to
his 1901 appointment as Attorney General of the United States by President McKinley. See R.
DEMMLER. supra note 21, at 28-29.
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became increasingly characterized by 'connections.' """' Lawyers who
were able to tap their own resources of acquaintances to perform spe-
cific services were in an extremely favorable position. The knowledge of
who could help, combined with a positive personal connection, provided
a potent weapon for maintaining economic independence. As the role of
business lawyers diversified, the need for specialists capable of "navi-
gating legal and political labyrinths" increased.152 By obtaining the ap-
propriate experience and connections early on, the lawyers of the emer-
gent law firms were in a strong economic position vis-a-vis their
corporate clients.
3. The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Advantage of Indepen-
dent Counsel1
53
Historically, the concept and the function of the attorney-client
privilege has been an important part of American law. The privilege
was established to promote freedom of consultation between legal ad-
visers and their clients.154 The establishment of a rule prohibiting com-
pelled disclosure by legal advisers lessened the public apprehension
about consulting with an attorney. The attorney-client privilege may be
invoked when the nature of the lawyer's advice is "legal. 1 55 However,
it has never been easy to distinguish legal from nonlegal advice.
In a period when the distinction between what was and what was
not legal work was increasingly blurred, the economic independence of
law firms helped to sharpen the distinction between legal and nonlegal
advice. During the late nineteenth century, significant controversy
arose concerning what information could be kept confidential under the
attorney-client privilege.156 The mere existence of this controversy pro-
vided a strong incentive for many clients to make special efforts to seek
out attorneys whose work would be deemed as legal. The economic and
physical distance of law firms gave the work of the law firm lawyers the
appearance, if not the reality, of being purely legal in nature.
As a result of the ruthless business practices of the monopolizing
corporate clients, the attorney-client privilege assumed great impor-
tance. The privilege often could be invoked to "block the proof of mis-
151. M. LARSON. supra note 18, at 126.
152. J. AUERBACH. supra note 2, at 38.
153. The discussion of the attorney-client privilege in the context of law firm emergence was
inspired by a conversation with Professor David Rosenberg of Harvard Law School.
154. C. MCCORMICK. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87 (3d ed. 1984).
155. Id. at 208.
156. J. WIGMORE. EvIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § ViII, at 545-90 (1961).
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deeds,"'157 or at least the unethical activities of the members of the ex-
panding corporations. On the other hand, because of the inevitable
nonlegal contact that occurs within the bureaucracy of a corporation,
hired lawyers would have had a far more difficult time invoking the
privilege.
The attorney-client privilege provided protection for both the cor-
porate entity and for the individual members of the corporation. Be-
cause the distinction between legal and nonlegal work was ambiguous,
independent lawyers were better able to invoke the privilege. Thus, the
attorney-client privilege provided a strong incentive for corporations to
retain independent legal counsel in the most crucial business matters.
4. Legal Services in the Production Process
The robber barons' first business contact with lawyers usually oc-
curred after litigation was initiated. The handling of these tangled af-
fairs provided the lawyers involved with valuable personal connections
and the commodity of experience. Swaine observed that the new corpo-
rate clients relied on lawyers familiar with their affairs, and when spe-
cial services were needed, these clients tended to let the lawyers obtain
the necessary assistance. 15 8 As the need for specialized assistance in-
creased, so too did the lawyers' need for additional legal staff.
Not all corporations fell into the pattern described above. As early
as the 1880's, there were lawyers who were paid comparatively meager
wages who formulated legal schemes that resulted in huge profits for
their employers. In Daniel Boorstin's discussion of the Standard Oil
Trust, he noted that Rockefeller's ingenious lawyer, Samuel C.T.
Dodd, was paid a "moderate salary."'5 9 However, as Boorstin went on
to state, "His [Dodd's] widely copied innovations eventually provided
much of the essential legal framework for the growth of big business
between the Civil War and the opening of the twentieth century." 8
Thus, some corporations did begin to impinge on the economic indepen-
dence of the business lawyer. Dodd received no huge fees for the profit-
able services he rendered. He was a salaried employee of the Standard
Oil Company of Ohio.
Why then were men like Shearman, Sterling, Reed, Smith, Shaw,
McClay and Cravath able to maintain their economic independence?
157. Id. at 578.
158. Swaine, supra note 69.
159. D. BOORSTIN, supra note 106, at 417.
160. Id.
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What distinguished them from Dodd? This phenomenon is arguably
explained by a combination of certain lawyers' early development of
the commodity of experience and useful interpersonal relations, and
also by how corporations viewed the supply of legal services. Corporate
clients differed in the value they placed on the attorney-client privilege,
and they differed in their conceptions of the role legal services played
in the production process.
Dodd was an "ingenious legal metaphysician," and as a result of
his careful studies of the infant oil industry he probably was knowl-
edgeable of the affairs of the Standard Oil Company,"' but Dodd did
not have as much to offer John D. Rockefeller as Shearman and Ster-
ling had to offer Jay Gould, or Philander Knox and Judge Reed had to
offer Andrew Carnegie. These law firm lawyers obtained the commod-
ity of experience at an early stage. They were aware of the intricacies
of their clients' business problems, and their clients had grown to rely
upon them. 162 More importantly, the law firm lawyers had been in-
volved with the network of men who had the greatest impact on their
clients' interests. As Demmler observed, Shearman and Sterling had
acquired the confidence of a number of men who came in contact with
the firm because of some association with Gould or Fisk.16 Similarly,
Knox's political ties worked to his advantage when performing legal
work for his many corporate clients. The bureaucratic setting of the
corporation did not provide Dodd with equivalent opportunities. The
lawyers of the law firms cultivated the experience and interpersonal
network that made their aid superior from their clients' viewpoint. In
short, the law firm lawyers were able to develop marketable qualities
because their corporate clients valued the advantages of independent
legal services and/or they failed to recognize at a sufficiently early
stage that legal services were a necessary factor input of production.
The independent law firms represented a number of large corpora-
tions. At first, the law firms were largely dependent on one corporation
or robber baron, but they diversified their clientele to a point where
they were able to maintain a steady and varied load of corporate work.
Initially, corporate clients sought out legal services when and only
when they perceived a need for them. Although the firm of Shearman
& Sterling spent a large percentage of its first few years dealing with
161. Id.
162. Demmler's depiction of the Carnegie-Reed relationship helps to clarify the distinction.
Carnegie considered Judge Reed to be an effective executive as well as a fine lawyer. See R.
DEMMLER. supra note 21, at 22-26.
163. Id. at 19.
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the affairs of Jay Gould and James Fisk, neither Shearman nor Ster-
ling ever became mere employees of these robber barons. On the con-
trary, the growing reputation of the firm brought in many new clients
who approached the firm regarding a variety of problems. This raised
the value of Shearman & Sterling's commodity of experience and per-
sonal connections to a level that made it improbable for one monopoliz-
ing corporation to buy out or absorb the firm.
Gould needed Shearman to deal with the complicated aftermath of
the Erie Wars. On the other hand, Rockefeller used Dodd to avoid and
overcome legal difficulties. The difference is significant. Rockefeller's
use of Dodd's services was equivalent to the recognition that legal ser-
vices were a necessary factor input of production. Gould's choice to use
independent legal counsel helped to assure Shearman & Sterling's eco-
nomic independence.
5. Summary
In the beginning of big business development, most corporate lead-
ers turned to lawyers only in times of extreme need for legal services.
This allowed certain lawyers to develop a specialized knowledge base
(the commodity of experience) as well as useful personal connections.
As corporate business increased in volume, lawyers increasingly were
forced, for functional reasons, to draw together into firms and expand
existing firms to serve these lucrative clients' demand for legal services.
Law firms were able to remain independent and develop a diverse clien-
tele because many corporate clients valued the advantages to be de-
rived from independent legal counsel (the attorney-client privilege)
and/or they did not initially perceive that legal services were a neces-
sary factor input of production. The additional experience and connec-
tions that were developed by serving a variety of clients made the value
of law firms so high that it was economically infeasible, in a short-run
time horizon, for corporations to "buy out" corporate law firms, or to
establish equivalent in-house legal departments.
By the time corporations began acting to secure in-house legal
counsel, the law firm's economic independence was secured. Most cor-
porations even included an "out-of-house" economically independent le-
gal counsel in an important decision making position."" Law firms had
monopolized the supply of the best corporate legal talent, 65 and be-
164. At his death John W. Sterling was a trustee or director of 18 corporations. See W.
EARLE, supra note 11, at 190-91.
165. The monopolization of talent quickly took the form of systematic recruitment. "The
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cause of the financial stakes involved, it made economic sense for cor-
porate clients to retain the most effective lawyers possible. By the end
of the nineteenth century, the most effective business lawyers were
found in law firms.
In the twentieth century, the corporate law department became
increasingly significant. However, these departments tended to deal
only with routine legal work. In the most important matters, a private
law firm was generally consulted. In the concluding section of this
work, the emergence of law firms in the American legal profession is
studied as a comprehensive whole, and some data concerning lawyers
and law firms in the twentieth century are studied.
V. A FINAL GLANCE AT THE LAW FIRM
The late nineteenth century was a watershed in the history of the
American legal profession. Hurst stressed that in the 1870's a "revolu-
tion . . . in the nature of law practice,"' 66 a "fundamental change in
legal education,"' 167 a "revolution in the cost of legal service,"'61 8 and a
"revived" effort at "formal organization of lawyers" began.6 9 Simi-
larly, Hobson saw the late nineteenth century as the period when the
development of large law firms, the growth in number and importance
of law schools, and the growth in number and size of local, state, and
national bar associations irreversibly transformed the profession.' 7"
This work explains one organizational phenomenon that was set in
motion during the late nineteenth century-the emergence of law firms.
Few generalizations have been made concerning the social actors in-
volved. The case studies of the first section reveal that Thomas
Shearman and James Reed both came from well connected back-
grounds, and in Section IV, it is argued that the new business lawyer
elite was not entirely new at all, but initially comprised those lawyers
who had already achieved high professional positions in other fields of
the law.' 7 1 However, these comments do not provide a sufficient
Cravath System," instituted by Paul D. Cravath, provided the first systematic recruitment by the
law firms of the "best" legal talent. By the beginning of the twentieth century, it was widely
emulated. Although a discussion of law firm recruitment patterns is relevant to a study of law
firms, it is not essential for an explanation of law firm emergence. See J. AUERBACH, supra note 2,
at 23-26; E. SMIGEL. supra note 103; R. SWAINE, supra note 20, at 657-58.
166. J. HURST. supra note 4, at 342.
167. Id. at 260.
168. Id. at 308.
169. Id. at 288.
170. Hobson, supra note 15, at 76.
171. R. SWAINE, supra note 20, at 370.
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description of those who made up the first law firms. According to Jer-
old S. Auerbach:
Only lawyers who possessed "considerable social capital" could in-
habit the corporate law firm world. Born in the East to old American
families of British lineage, they were college graduates (a distinct rar-
ity) who followed their fathers into business and professional careers.
They . . .restricted access to those who presented proper ethnic and
social credentials . . . . [D]oors to particular legal careers required
keys that were distributed according to race, religion, sex and ethnic-
ity . . . .[M]obility was not a ladder whose rungs all could climb."' 2
A cursory glance at any law firm history strongly supports Auerbach's
statement. However, what is most striking is that proper "social capi-
tal" remained a necessity into the 1970's.
In the final chapter of Shearman & Sterling's law firm history,
Earle catalogued the partners of the firm as of June 30, 1962. The
chapter included brief biographies of the thirty-seven partners as well
as thirty-five of the partners' pictures. (The remaining two partners'
pictures were included earlier in the book.) All thirty-seven of the part-
ners were white and male. Thirty-three attended at least one Ivy
League school, and twenty graduated from Harvard Law School. In
addition, twenty-eight of the partners attended private secondary
schools.'
On the surface, prestigious educational backgrounds justified a
seemingly meritocratic makeup of large law firms. However, as
Auerbach perceptively noted, "Social filters . . . functioned at antece-
dent and subsequent stages to deplete drastically the pool from which
the Law Review meritocracy, and law firms partners, were chosen."'" 4
In sum, even as late as 1962, a firm like Shearman & Sterling was a
restricted organization.
By the 1970's, the large law firms' requirement of a "proper" so-
cial background appeared to be declining in importance. However, the
status of the members of the large corporate law firms remained un-
changed. From the first hesitant emergence of corporate law firms in
the 1870's until the present, the members of the major corporate law
firms have maintained their position at the pinnacle of the legal profes-
sion. But this is a static perception of the legal profession that ignores
what has been going on within the non-firm majority of the American
172. J. AUERBACH, supra note 2, at 21-22.
173. W. EARLE, supra note II, at 353-425.
174. J. AUERBACH, supra note 2, at 28.
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bar.
To be an elite of anything there must be non-elites to maintain the
position of the elites. Therefore, changes that occur within the non-elite
sector of the legal profession are crucial to members of even the most
prestigious corporate law firms.
Throughout this article, the emphasis has been solely on the elite
corporate lawyers of the legal profession. In conclusion, it is fitting to
broaden the analysis and examine the non-elite sector of the profession.
Social stratification of the American bar has been a historical fact
since the earliest periods of American history. In the pre-Civil War
years, an important distinction of elite lawyers was their skill in ora-
tory. By the early twentieth century, the basis of stratification had sig-
nificantly changed. The ascendancy of the corporate lawyers of the law
firms coincided with an increase of lawyers from eastern and southern
European backgrounds. The ethnic and religious difference of the
"new-immigrant metropolitan solo practitioners" prohibited them from
entering the elite world of the corporate law firms." 5
The immigrant solo practitioners had little in common with corpo-
rate lawyers. In fact, the difference was so salient that in 1921 Alfred
Z. Reed, in his report on legal education, sponsored by the Carnegie
Foundation, suggested that the bar be separated into two grades of
lawyers.178 Reed also suggested that the bar offer two types of bar ex-
ams, one for business lawyers and one for solo practitioners. 77 Reed
recognized the reality of the socially stratified American bar, and he
defined the key strata of the early twentieth century bar as the elite
corporation lawyers and the individual practitioners.
Reed's two-tiered perception of the American bar was correct
when placed in its historical context. In the 1920's, the bar could be
usefully bifurcated into the elite business lawyers of the urban law
firms and the individually practicing majority. By 1924, at least ten
cities had law firms containing a minimum of twelve lawyers or seven
partners.17 8 But even as late as 1954, the majority of lawyers were still
practicing without partners. 9
Throughout the post-World War II era, the percentage of law firm
associated lawyers continued to grow and that of individual practition-
175. Id. at 62.
176. A. REED. TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW 416-20 (1921).
177. Id. at 418.
178. Hobson, supra note 15, at 166. New York City alone had thirty-four such firms, and
Chicago had seventeen.
179. Lawyers-Selected Characteristics: 1948 to 1970, supra note 1.
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ers sharply declined. (These numerical trends are not indicative of
trends in status.) The following tables illuminate these trends (figures
show percentage of the legal profession):"' °
PARTNERS OR ASSOCIATES8 1
1948 1951 1954 1957 1960 1963 1966 1970 1980
26% 26% 26% 25% 26% 30% 31% 33% 35%
INDIVIDUAL PRACTITIONERS
8 2
1948 1951 1954 1957 1960 1963 1966 1970 1980
56% 54% 53% 47% 41% 38% 36% 33.5% 33%
The above tables also reveal a fascinating structural change in the
post-World War II legal profession. In 1948, 82% of the legal profes-
sion either was an individual practitioner or worked with a law firm,
but by 1980 only 68% of the profession fell into these two categories.
By 1980, the basis for Reed's two-tiered view of the profession had
been destroyed. Yet, as the individual practitioner continued to decline
in numerical importance, another segment of the legal profession was
growing significantly.
As the following table displays, between 1948 and 1980 the per-
centage of non-firm salaried lawyers more than quadrupled:
SALARIED LAWYERS (PRIVATE INDUSTRY)'8
1948 1951 1954 1957 1960 1963 1966 1970 1980
3% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 10% 11% 14%
The above figures suggest that the return to a two-tiered legal profes-
sion is a possibility. 84 The new distinction among lawyers would be
whether or not a lawyer is a non-firm salaried lawyer or a lawyer with
180. This information was compiled from the STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES,
supra note I. To find the percentages for 1948, it was necessary to estimate the total number of
lawyers in the United States. However, this estimate was extrapolated by comparing the total
number of lawyers to the number of reporting lawyers (to the Martindale-Hubbell Law Direc-
tory) of all succeeding years. The percentage difference between "all lawyers" and "lawyers re-
porting" remained relatively constant throughout the years listed. Thus, the extrapolation is prob-
ably quite accurate.
181. Lawyers-Selected Characteristics: 1954 to 1980, supra note I, at 177; Lawyers -
Selected Characteristics: 1948 to 1970, supra note 1, at 416.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. By 1980, law firm lawyers, individual practitioners, and salaried lawyers made up
only 82% of the profession. The remaining part of the profession contained the government law-
yers, the judges, and the retired and/or inactive lawyers. Historically, the percentage of govern-
ment lawyers in the legal profession has increased significantly.
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a private firm. (It is interesting that by 1980, over nine percent of the
legal profession worked for the government. 185 If one considers these
lawyers as non-firm salaried workers, then fully 23% of the legal pro-
fession worked as a non-firm salaried employee by 1980.) s8
In the 1980's, the organization of the law firm is numerically
stronger than ever. However, as the individually practicing lawyer be-
comes increasingly anachronistic, the non-firm sector of the legal pro-
fession is strengthening its affiliation with powerful organizations
outside the jurisdiction of the profession. The growth of the salaried
lawyers of industry and government are moving the legal profession
towards a revised two-tiered bar.
The business lawyers of the emergent law firms of the late nine-
teenth century achieved elite status by displacing the Webster ideal
type of lawyer. The ascendancy of corporate lawyers, as Auerbach
noted, marked "a critical turning point in the emergence of the modern
American legal profession. 11 87 With the help of the lawyers' organiza-
tion, the law firm, the corporate lawyers successfully served powerful
clients, maintained economic independence, and achieved tremendous
power and prestige.
One of the explanations of the emergent law firms' ability to main-
tain economic independence was that the emergent law firms were able
to maintain their economic independence from monopolizing corpora-
tions because businessmen were slow to recognize that legal services
were a necessary factor input of production. Once corporations recog-
nized the need for comprehensive legal services, it was not economically
feasible, in the short term to buy out or effectively replace law firms.
The tremendous rise of the salaried lawyer in the post-World War
II period raises questions about the long-term market of law firms. The
extensive client diversity and impressive talent pool18 8 of the present-
day firms appear to assure continued economic power for some time to
come; additionally, independent counsel can still be an important legal
advantage. But in a long-term perspective, the economic viability of the
185. Id.
186. Associates of large law firms are also salaried employees. As private firms grow in size
and in-house legal departments grow in sophistication, large firm associate positions may increas-
ingly resemble the non-firm salaried lawyers in terms of status, salary, and sophistication of the
work experience.
187. J. AUERBACH, supra note 2, at 38.
188. However, as early as the 1960's it was noted, "Industry and government have become
much more effective adversaries for the law firm recruiter." See Gayle, Recruiting, Training, and
Managing Young Lawyers-from a Large Firm Viewpoint, in PARTNERSHIP PROBLEMS AND NEW
DEVELOPMENTS IN LAW OFFICE EQUIPMENT I (1967).
640 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:593
corporation oriented law firm may be challenged by the non-firm sala-
ried lawyer.
If the ascendancy of the corporate lawyer marked the emergence
of the modern American legal profession, then the rise of the salaried
lawyer may signify a new watershed. Law firms emerged for social-
structural, technological, and entrepreneurial reasons. The functional
factors appear to supply the greatest part of the explanation of law firm
emergence; however, the entrepreneurial drives of the elite law firm
lawyers were undeniably significant. In the United States of the 1980's,
entrepreneurial drives and self-interested concerns for the market may
still be alive and well in the legal profession, but questions about the
long-term prospects of corporate law firms arise in the face of the un-
precedented growth in importance of the non-firm salaried lawyer.
